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ABSTRACT: This paper concerns the technologies used in radioisotope production in the 
French Atomic Energy Commission (the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique) between 1946 
and 1958. Particular attention is given to the various instruments used for the bombardment 
of isotopes, including accelerators and reactors, and their relationship with the CEA’s radio-
isotope preparation laboratories. Ultimately, the vast majority of bombardments took place in 
research reactors. These versatile machines, and the isotopes and other materials that passed 
through them, act as historical tracers: they shed light on the orientation of the entire atomic 
system in which radioisotope production is found. 
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The Saclay pile (called P2 or EL2) will allow for the production of
[radioisotopes] in quantities sufficient for all demands of a scientific,
 therapeutic, or industrial nature.
 Lew Kowarski, 1951 1.
Strange pustules erode French uranium, paralyzing our 2nd atomic pile.
Headline in France Dimanche, 7-13 September 1952.
 1. Kowarski, Lew. Handwritten manuscript, September 1951. Niels Bohr Library, American Institute 
of Physics. Series IV, Box 4, Folder 3.
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1. Introduction
While examing the uses, users and distribution of radioisotopes, we ought 
to consider how and where radioisotopes are made. In a technical sense, 
«how» is simple: one must bombard an isotope with a nucleon and then 
prepare the irradiated isotope for use as an experimental or therapeutic 
instrument. But beginning with irradiation, the simplicity breaks down. 
First of all, two sorts of machines exist for this irradiation, the particle 
accelerator and the nuclear reactor, and these machines fall into several 
sub-categories, to be considered below. Moreover, beyond any question 
of supply and demand outside of atomic agencies, there exists within 
them a link between irradiation and the preparation of radioisotopes, 
as well as a link between the orientation of the system and the quantity 
and nature of radioisotopes produced. In post World War II France, the 
number of preparations for the delivery of radioisotopes increased along 
with irradiations of the same, and the overall number of radioisotopes 
produced and delivered by the French atomic agency, the Commissariat à 
l’Energie Atomique (CEA), rose with the expansion of the Commissariat’s 
budget and resources. But not exactly. Radioisotope production required 
far less capital than making atomic bombs or generating electricity. Yet, 
despite their relatively low cost, the number of radioisotopes produced 
was not always proportional to the increased resources pouring into the 
CEA, and this variability sheds light on the orientation of the system as 
well as the nature of the research reactors used for the vast majority of 
irradiations.
As noted, the machines used to bombard isotopes changed by type: 
reactors replaced particle accelerators as the main platform for irradiation. 
And they grew more powerful: bigger reactors with higher neutron fluxes 
could make a wider variety of increasingly more powerful and numerous 
radioisotopes. It has been shown that with the resultant industrialization 
of radioisotope production, in France as in the US, Britain and elsewhere, 
the relationship between government and the various institutions using 
radioisotopes changed —a mark of the historical importance of this mass 
production 2. What, though, was the significance of this qualitative and 
 2. Angela Creager finds that mass-production of radioisotopes in the US greatly increased 
government involvement in production and distribution, and that in the US «production and 
circulation of these hot commodities bound together the government, industry, hospitals, 
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quantitative leap in radioisotope production within the atomic programmes 
themselves? Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold considered the problem 
when they examined the British atomic programme of the early 1950s:
«Radioisotopes were incidental to the main purposes of the British atomic 
energy project, the first and most important example of «spin-off» (...) In this 
grim and troubled period the radioisotope programme was, as one scientist 
observed, «the only blessing which has so far arisen from the development 
of nuclear energy—an indirect one, but in a field where blessings have been 
comparatively rare it should not be overlooked on that account» 3.
One is reluctant to say that radioisotopes were «incidental» given that 
they were in the planning in Britain from 1944, that they were planned from 
1946 in France, and that in the US production began as early as November 
1943, a year and a half before the first atomic bombs were envailable 4. 
However, Gowing and Arnold are perfectly right to suggest that radioisotope 
production was not central to the British atomic programme, as it required 
far fewer resources than making bombs. Nevertheless, there it was, planned 
for. Below, in an attempt to consider the place of radioisotope production 
in a nuclear complex that was geared towards making weapons, I examine 
the accelerators, reactors and radiochemical laboratories of the CEA from 
1946 to 1958 —in what machines were isotopes bombarded, how often, 
and where were they sent for post-irradiation preparation? In so doing, a 
door opens to a larger problem: what was the orientation and nature of 
the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique? Historians describing the CEA of 
the period have thought big: the CEA was a «nationalist technopolitical 
regime», an embodiment of «grand programme» scientific practice in France, 
«a state within a state«, and, according to the CEA itself, «a mountain of 
progress and innovation» 5. Indeed, the CEA was in its way all of these. 
and scientists». Creager, Angela. The Industrialization of Radioisotopes by the US Atomic 
Energy Commission. In: Grandin, Karl; Wormbs, Nina; Widmalm, Sven, eds. The Science-Industry 
Nexus: History, Policy, Implications. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 123. Sagamore Beach. 
MA: Science History Publications; 2004, p. 141-167, 157.
 3. Gowing, Margaret; Arnold, Laura. Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 
1945-1952. Volume II. New York: St. Martin’s Press; 1974, p. 337-338.
 4. Gowing; Arnold, n. 3, p. 316-338; Creager, n. 2, p. 146.
 5. («Nationalist technopolitical regime») Hecht, Gabrielle. The radiance of France: Nuclear power and 
national identity after World War II. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 1998. («Grand programme») 
Jacq, François. Practiques scientifiques, formes d’organisation et représentations de la science 
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This is because, technologically-speaking, the CEA was above all else a 
reactor-building institution, and its reactors were finely suited to do and 
make a number of things. As reactors came on line, this left a lot of space 
for radioisotopes; but still, space was limited.
2. The cyclotron, Collège de France
CEA radioisotope production did not begin with a reactor, or even in 
the CEA proper. The CEA was founded in 1945 and began to assemble 
itself in 1946; for radioisotopes, it depended on CEA High Commissiona 
Frédéric Joliot’s cyclotron, finished in 1940 in the basement of the 
Collège de France. Like all cyclotrons, the Collège de France machine 
could only produce radioisotopes slowly and at considerable expense, as 
Ernest Lawrence discovered in the 1930s when he used a cyclotron to 
make radioisotopes for hospitals and scientific laboratories 6. During the 
war, Joliot used the radioisotope output of his cyclotron as well as that 
of a Van de Graaff accelerator in his laboratory in the Paris suburbs to 
trace biological and chemical processes 7. The work was characteristic of 
cyclotron use elsewhere. As in the United States (Berkeley, St Louis, etc.) 
and Britain (Cambridge and Liverpool), radioisotope-producing cyclotrons 
were found at universities. And research with these radioisotopes had to be 
undertaken nearby; their short half-lives rendered them useless if transport 
dans la France de l’après-guerre: la «politique de la science» comme enoncé collectif (1944-
1962) [PhD dissertation]. Ecole Normale Supérieure des Mines; 1996. («A state within a state») 
Bendjebbar, André. La bombe atomique et deux républiques, 1939-1969 [PhD dissertation]. 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques; 2000. («A mountain of progress and innovation»). Dautray, Robert. 
Une oeuvre scientifique. Les défis du CEA. n. 41. September-October 1995. p. 11.
 6. By running his 37-inch cyclotron for a day and a night, Lawrence could manage but one clinical 
dose of P32. Even the smallest experimental reactors could produce P32 in quantities of an 
order of magnitude greater, while being put to use for other tasks besides. Heilbron, J.L.; 
Seidel, Robert W. Lawrence and his Laboratory: A history of the Lawrence Berkeley laboratory. 
Berkeley: University of California Press; 1989, p. 279.
 7. Pinault, Michel. Frédéric Joliot-Curie. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob; 2000. See especially chapter 
XIII «Travailler sous l’occupation: chercheurs, universitaires et industriels». Weart, Spencer 
R. Scientists in power. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1979, p. 156-162. See 
also Joliot-Curie, Fréderic; Joliot-Curie, Irène. Oeuvres scientifiques complètes. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France; 1961. 
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was too time-consuming. Joliot hardly travelled at all: he collaborated on 
biomedical experiments with researchers in Paris 8.
The CEA’s first radioisotopes came from Joliot’s machine. Among 
the lab’s top scientists was Pierre Süe, who medical researcher Maurice 
Tubiana called «a remarkable chemist, a virtuoso at rapid synthesis for 
introducing a short-lived radioelement into a complex molecule». «Rapid» 
was a necessity: «[Y]ou must remember that in this period, 1946 to 
1949, we had radioelements of only very short [half-lives], not exceeding 
some thirty minutes, all of which were made either from radium-beryllium 
sources or with the old, sputtering cyclotron at the Collège» 9. Researchers 
in France like Tubiana faced serious material difficulties; it was virtually 
impossible to find «radioelements with medium or long half-lives (iodine-
131, phosphorous-32, iron-59) (...) indispensable for biological and medical 
research». Here the cyclotron could help, as it provided a supply of 8-day 
iodine131, however meagre 10.
In 1947, Joliot’s cyclotron functioned sixteen hours a day. Joliot and 
the CEA Scientific Committee were delighted and wondered what CEA 
researchers could do with the cyclotron’s output of radioisotopes —at which 
point they faced its limits square on. Only two or three research teams 
could scrape by with such a low yield. All the worse, even if they managed 
to produce radioisotopes, the CEA did not yet have adequate facilities to 
house more biology and biomedical research teams. The Scientific Committee 
agreed that they must first complete a permanent atomic research centre, 
then build a cyclotron and reactor on its premises 11.
 8. During the war, Joliot also attempted to start a corporation, SEDARS, the «Syndicat pour 
l’étude et le développement des applications des radioéléments sythétiques». In a letter to 
the director of the Institut Pasteur, he envisioned what it would do: «Presently I am having 
carried out the construction by industry of two large cyclotrons and I am proceeding to train 
technicians. A laboratory is planned where researchers, in particular biologists, will study how 
to properly manipulate and measure these new radioactive substances and to use them in 
their own laboratories». Pinault, Michel. Aux débuts de la «Big Science». La création et l’essor 
des laboratoires des Joliot-Curie. In: Pinault, Michel, ed. Doisneau chez les Joliot-Curie: Un 
photographe au pays des physiciens. Paris: Musée des Arts et Métiers/Sommières: Romain 
Pages Editions; 2005, p. 12-27, 23.
 9. Tubiana, Maurice. Témoignage sur Frédéric Joliot-Curie. In: Bordry, Monique; Radvanyi, Pierre, 
eds. Oeuvre et engagement de Frédéric Joliot-Curie. Les Ulis: EDP Sciences; 2001, p. 60-63, 
61.
 10. Tubiana, n. 9, p. 61.
 11. Procès-Verbal du Comité Scientifique, March 4, 1947. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. This 
cyclotron, the Saclay cyclotron, was finished in 1954.
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While cyclotrons were radioisotope producers, few would have called 
them efficient. Nevertheless, the perceived versatility and usefulness that 
radioisotope production lent to cyclotrons and other particle accelerators 
never disappeared. In 1952, High Commissioner Francis Perrin seized 
upon it. When industry-minded Administrator General Pierre Guillaumat 
questioned the CEA’s need to commit funds to what would become the 
Saclay synchrotron, Perrin found three strategies to defend his case. The 
synchrotron would be assembled in part by private industry, Guillaumat’s 
preferred method; only with it could France train physicists to work at 
CERN; and the synchrotron, like the cyclotrons before it, had «its usefulness 
(...) in particular the making of certain artificial radioelements». Even after 
CEA particle accelerators had lost their relevance as radioisotope producers, 
Perrin could still present them as such. Guillaumat agreed to launch a formal 
study for the accelerator programme 12.
3. The experimental reactor, Zoé
In the CEA, reactors came to supersede particle accelerators as platforms 
for radioisotope production, and histories of the CEA have usually treated 
those reactors as important, if not with reverence. Scholars of the French 
atomic bomb have been particularly interested in how and when plutonium 
production reactors appeared. In such cases, reactors are treated in context, 
their origins as written into the CEA’s first long-term industrial plan, which 
itself is added to the list of developments having some bearing on the more 
pressing problem of the politics behind the bomb 13. Reactors have also 
appeared as a nexus of scientific interests and practices; naturally, around 
reactors of any size, groups of engineers and scientists must collect and 
interact, and their exact organization within the larger CEA to some extent 
demonstrates the nature of the whole 14. They also appear as symbolic 
and instrumental incarnations of atomic policy; reactor design, and the 
 12. Procès-Verbal du Comité de l’Energie Atomique, November 6, 1952. Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique.
 13. Mongin, Dominique. La bombe atomique française, 1945-1958. Brussels: Bruylant; Paris: LGDJ; 
1997. Pô, Jean-Damien. Les moyens de la puissance: les activités militaires du CEA (1945-
2000). Paris: Ellipses; 2001; Scheinman, Lawrence. Atomic Energy Policy in France under the 
Fourth Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1965.
 14. Jacq, n. 5.
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reactor’s consequent capabilities, affects policy-implementation as well as 
policy-making at the highest level 15.
Yet, oddly, in the case of the relationship between reactors and 
radioisotopes, in-house celebratory publications that might ring most hollow 
reveal the most. Why? In the case of radioisotope production, all of the 
reactors within an atomic programme matter, because radioisotopes are 
relatively cheap and easy to make, and, if suitably adapted, any reactor can 
be used to bombard them with neutrons. Until the beginning of the 1960s 
all of the CEA’s reactors, even its plutonium production reactors, were put 
to such use. Thus, CEA-produced accounts describing the CEA’s advance 
from one reactor to the next can provide quite useful information as to how 
and why radioisotope production increased over the years.
The CEA was never shy about celebrating its first reactor (and is still 
celebrating it); before it, despite moving its administration into a well-
appointed headquarters and despite the development of a research facility 
at the unused fort of Châtillon in the suburbs of Paris, the CEA found itself 
taking cover from criticism. As of the summer of 1947, it had produced next 
to nothing, at least nothing obvious to the public and body politic. This 
led to an especially difficult state of affairs, when 1947’s severe inflation 
could be contrasted to the CEA’s substantial budget 16. The CEA’s Scientific 
Committee had expected to finish the first French reactor by the end of that 
year 17. However, the hiring of competent scientists and engineers proceeded 
 15. Hecht, Gabrielle. The Radiance of France. Cambridge: MIT Press; 1998. See Chapter two.
 16. In July 1947 the Scientific Committee believed that «the time has come for the high commissioner 
to hold a press conference» to follow a plenary session with Prime Minister Paul Ramadier 
(Procès-Verbal du Comité Scientifique, July 8, 1947. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique). After 
encountering unexpected criticism at the conference, the Committee decided not to hold 
another until they could present the world with a concrete achievement. For these first years 
of the CEA see Weart, n. 7. Goldschmidt, Bertrand. L’Aventure atomique. Paris: Fayard; 1962; 
Goldschmidt, Bertrand. Les rivalités atomiques 1939-1966. Paris: Fayard; 1967 [translated by 
Georges Temmer as Atomic Rivals. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; 1990]. For an 
account centered around the figure of Frédéric Joliot, see Pinault, n. 7.
 17. And they suffered from no shortage of ideas as to what to do with it. Their expectations took 
several forms. The Scientific Committee planned for biological and medical services. The 
military representative of the CEA steering committee asked for radioisotopes in order to 
study «lesions caused by radio-active elements». Lew Kowarski wondered whether a «Comité 
National Français» would not be necessary to oversee radioisotope distribution, while Jules 
Guéron foresaw a need for national legislation. For biological and medical services see Procès 
Verbal du Comité Scientifique, September 9, 1946, January 27, 1947, and June 10, 1947. For 
the Army’s request for radioisotopes, see Procès-Verbal du Comité Scientifique, January 27, 
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slowly, and production of pure uranium proved elusive. That summer, the 
CEA Scientific Committee became convinced that any reactor, no matter 
what its fuel or power, would be of benefit, as it would demonstrate the 
ability of the French programme to construct substantial nuclear apparatus. 
The CEA had UO2, heavy water and personnel on hand, and any question 
as to whether to do this quickly became rhetorical.
The result was Zoé 18, an experimental reactor. It was ‘experimental’ 
for two reasons. First and most obviously, within Zoé’s core France initiated 
its first chain reaction—an experiment of sorts which France completed 
on December 15, 1948. Second, experimental reactor here indicates size. 
First reactors in other countries, such as CP-1 in the United States, F1 
in Russia and ZEEP in Canada, tended to be simple, low-power devices. 
Its place in the sequence of French reactors and simple design served to 
designate Zoé as experimental as well, and to differentiate it from France’s 
reactors to follow.
Zoé the reactor and the CEA cyclotron were different by definition 
and by nuance. The task of assembling Zoé involved more distinct teams 
of specialists: physicists to plot design, chemists to assure the purity of 
its materials, electricians to arrange its control and safety systems, and 
engineers and technicians to construct the superstructure and mechanisms. 
In addition, greater amounts of exotic materials like uranium oxide and 
heavy water went into Zoé. Yet there were similarities as well. Both Zoé and 
the cyclotron required a substantial crew to operate them. Both released 
high-energy nuclear particles to bombard targets —in the cyclotron by 
placing the target before a particle beam, in the reactor by placing the 
target amidst a swarm of neutrons.
A one-dimensional beam versus neutrons in a three-dimensional space: 
this difference was of particular importance. Both cyclotrons and reactors 
were multiple-use machines. Besides making radioisotopes, cyclotrons 
could be used to induce fission or to otherwise crash one particle into 
another for the purposes of experiment. But they could be used for only 
1947. For national committee and legislation, see Procès-Verbal du Comité Scientifique, 
March 4, 1947. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique.
 18. Lew Kowarski’s invention: Zero energy, uranium Oxide, Eau lourde. He flirted with the acronym 
FLOP (French Low Output Pile) until Joliot learned that it was the English equivalent of four, 
a theatrical fiasco. As for the other French reactors of our period, P2’s («pile 2») designation 
later became EL2 («eau lourde 2»), and Zoé’s became, officially, EL1. G1, G2 and G3 gained 
their designations from their moderator, graphite.
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one such task at a time. Even low-power experimental reactors such as 
Zoé were importantly different. Activities could coincide. Isotopes might 
be put in the core of Zoé while counters were calibrated, control and 
safety mechanisms were tested, materials for next-generation reactors 
were subjected to heat and radiation, or any number of experiments 
were carried out in one of Zoé’s several experimental channels. The last 
is crucial: there was room in the core of even the smallest reactor for 
several objects, isotopes being but one sort. So, excepting shutdown of 
the reactor itself (necessary to remove radioisotopes in the first place), 
radioisotope production from a reactor was steady, as opposed to a 
cyclotron’s intermittent output.
Zoé’s schedule during the summer of 1949 became typical: mornings 
were reserved for neutron flux measurements and graphite purity tests, 
afternoons for various experiments and particle detector calibrations, 
and evenings —the night shift— for radioisotope production 19. An initial 
batch of those radioisotopes included phosphorous-32, sulfur-35, calcium-
45 and iodine-131. Zoé advanced France to self-sufficiency in relatively 
weak variations of sodium-24, bromide-80 and arsenic-76. Lew Kowarski, 
the CEA’s Director of Scientific Services, noted that by 1950 deliveries of 
radioisotopes issuing from Zoé totalled about 100 per month. By March 
1952, the CEA had made 2,916 deliveries 20. Zoé’s neutrons boosted the 
half-lives of the types of radioisotopes that the cyclotron already produced, 
and made new radioisotopes.
Longer half-lives; more sorts of radioisotopes; and more of them. Users 
of radioisotopes in France multiplied thanks to all three factors. Greater 
availability was, of course, the principle reason. So too were longer half-lives: 
compared to one from a cyclotron, a radioisotope from an experimental 
reactor could be transported considerably farther away before it was no 
longer useful 21. In addition, Zoé’s steady output gave the CEA’s Section des 
 19. Comptes Rendus du Sous Comité de la Pile de Châtillon, May 20 1949 and July 22, 1949. 
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. M6/14.22 (1) 76-879 HC.
 20. Kowarski, Lew. Le progrès de l’énergie nucléaire en France. Fourth World Power Conference, 
London; 1950. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. DRI F4/22 78&79. Goldschmidt, Bertrand. La 
consommation des radioéléments artifiels en France d’Octobre 1949 à Avril 1952. Commissariat 
à l’Energie Atomique. Fonds Toutée-Vergne, 85 H3.
 21. One might imagine a circle radiating out from Collège de France or Châtillon. From the Collège 
cyclotron the circle reached into the Parisian suburbs; from Châtillon, it reached into Belgium. 
And users abounded: various academic institutions in Paris; government agencies such as 
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Radioéléments its first chance to hone techniques for separating radioisotopes. 
Before Zoé, the Section had found itself without enough material to learn 
how to prepare various radioisotopes, much less manufacture them in 
number. With the reactor, the Section became a viable unit in the CEA, 
including by 1952 seven engineers and eight technicians, led by Section 
Head Charlie Fisher 22. Unfortunately, the Section found itself unable to 
study techniques for certain radioisotopes, including highly-irradiated 
samples of phosphorous, iodine, cobalt and iron; France imported those 
from Britain.
Here then was the catch, Zoé’s limit. Imports from Britain increased 
in rhythm with the French reactor’s output. The CEA made approximately 
300 deliveries of radioisotopes in 1949 and 1,000 the following year. 1951 
was the year of sustained radioisotope manufacture, revealing what sort 
of production Zoé alone could maintain: 1,431 deliveries. These deliveries 
must be measured against imports, almost all coming from Britain: while 
no clear measure can be obtained for 1949, Britain made approximately 
500 deliveries in 1950 and approximately 700 in 1951. Clearly, if demand 
continued to increase, then imports had to rise with it. Even after upgrade, 
Zoé could not cover the gap. In 1952 Zoé underwent a partial reconstruction 
—replacement of uranium oxide with natural uranium and the addition of a 
cooling unit to its heavy water pump system. It could now run continuously 
at 150 kilowatts. This intensified its neutron flux by an order of magnitude, 
but given that Zoé had begun life as a zero-power reactor, this meant little 
in terms of radioisotope production. Gains were marginal; radioisotope 
deliveries coming from Zoé increased by a few hundred at best, no different 
from earlier increases.
the Ministry of Education, the Inspection des Subsistances, and the Laboratoire Central de 
l’Armement; private industries including steel makers, engineering firms, heavy machinery 
manufacturers and petroleum refineries; the nationalized gas and electric industries; French 
and foreign hospitals; and, of course, the CEA itself. In addition, the CEA actively encouraged 
and aided several of these agencies to exploit radioisotopes. See Emplois non médicaux des 
radioéléments, May 28, 1950. Archives Nationales, 307AP 223. See also Guéron, Jules. Some 
industrial applications of radioelements made at the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. 
Rapport CEA no. 122, 1952 (paper presented at the Radioisotopes Techniques Conference, 
Oxford, England, July 19, 1951). Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. For a description of the 
first uses to which Zoé was put, see also Ertaud, André. Utilisation et fonctionnement de la 
pile de Châtillon. Atomes. 1949; 35: 50-51.
 22. Goldschmidt, n. 16, p. 2.
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4. The research reactor, P2
France completed its second reactor in October 1952. Lew Kowarski named 
it P2 («Pile 2»), an apt designation, as cold as ‘Zoé’ was warm; the name 
indicates the primary difference between it and Zoé, one which was historical. 
It had a precedent in the form of Zoé (later in the 1950s to become «EL1» 
to P2’s «L2»). Precedent meant crews experienced in reactor construction 
and operation 23; and it meant a Section des Radioéléments practiced in 
preparing irradiated isotopes for practical use and shipment. P2’s output 
of radioisotopes could easily be integrated into the CEA’s radioisotope 
production system.
As a machine, P2 most differed from Zoé in its complexity. Kowarski 
called Zoé «a fundamentally easy thing to build», uranium oxide dipped 
into a tub filled with heavy water 24. Here the Director of Scientific Services 
disregarded (one senses on purpose) the nascent technological system 
required to build such a machine, but, as far as the design and function of 
Zoé were concerned, Kowarski spoke accurately. P2 was more powerful 
and complex. Like Zoé, P2 dipped uranium into heavy water, but otherwise 
it broke new ground. It included aluminum-clad natural uranium rods (as 
opposed to Zoé’s uranium oxide ones) loaded into 135 tubes. In addition, the 
Scientific Committee planned for a cooling system circulating compressed 
CO2 gas around P2’s core, a coolant unprecedented in the atomic world. 
In its final form, P2 included nineteen horizontal channels for irradiation 
and flux measurements, eight vertical channels 25, and a thermal column. 
 23. As early as 1950, almost two years before P2 went critical, Kowarski could tell an international 
audience that «the number of technicians who are familiar with the operations of the 
Châtillon pile and are capable of watching over it has grown (at the beginning of 1950) to 
about twenty; half a dozen engineers are able to work out and devise new types of reactors, 
and, when needed, to find new solutions». Kowarski, n. 20.
 24. Kowarski, Lew. Interview with Charles Weiner, 1969. p. 183. American Institute of Physics.
 25. In addition, apparently at the insistence of Irène Joliot-Curie, there were 35 small vertical 
channels, designated «for chemists». They were positioned in between the vertical fuel 
elements («not very convenient» remembers Jacques Bernot), above the core, outside of any 
intense flux of neutrons. They went largely unused. Bernot, Jacques. Interview, 31 October 
2005. Historique sur la construction et l’utilisation d’EL2 (Juin 1949-Janvier 1960). Commissariat 
à l’Energie Atomique. Service des Grandes Piles de Saclay, HC F6/23.30. (Hereafter referred 
to as Historique I). For the best description, see: IAEA Directory of Nuclear Reactors. Vols I-IV. 
Vienna; 1960, 1962, p. 269-273.
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This greatly augmented the CEA’s volume of irradiation space, in a core of 
much higher neutron flux.
It entailed a shift in quantity and quality of radioisotopes. The difference 
was not so dramatic as that between Zoé and the cyclotron; it was one of 
degree, not type. Nevertheless, that degree was important. Whereas at best 
Zoé could produce isotopes for a yearly total of 1,431 deliveries (1951), P2 
could make for 3,600 deliveries (1956; this includes a handful deliveries 
from Zoé, used at that point for training and materials testing, and a few 
deliveries from G1, about which below) 26. 
As a site, and sight, of production, P2 differed very little from its 
predecessor. A visitor in its warehouse-like housing would see a large steel-
framed concrete block, railing atop, the covers of experimental channels 
appearing regularly upon the sides of its radiation-protective shield and 
scattered electrical equipment surrounding it. This was hardly different from 
Zoé; from the outside P2 was merely a bigger concrete cube. The persistent 
observer, however, would count more experimental channels. Of course, 
he or she could not see the aluminium-clad uranium metal inside P2; but 
he could not fail to notice the cylindrical metal uptake for P2’s coolant and 
perceive P2’s greater heat output and power. 
In effect, it was the uptake that led to technical troubles unknown with 
Zoé. As noted, P2’s cooling system was unprecedented, and, as it turned 
out, not an easy one to master. (Even before its start-up, P2 encountered 
halting technical difficulties 27. Kowarski claimed to have told a journalist, 
«If the reactor works as predicted, then this experiment will have been 
superfluous» 28. If so, he was not disappointed.) Advancing cautiously, 
P2’s operators employed nitrogen before attempting to use CO2, preparing 
the pile to function at full power. On March 4, 1953, as they eased it 
 26. Statistics for annual deliveries and imports are taken from the corresponding CEA Annual 
Reports. Figures for deliveries and imports are combined in the 1955 Annual Report; deliveries 
alone for previous years are summarized in the 1960 Annual Report. Thus imports have been 
estimated by calculating radioisotopes unaccounted for in the 1960 Annual Report. Data 
for deliveries in 1956 is recorded in the 1957 Annual Report. I could find no reliable data for 
imports following 1957.
 27. Blisters appeared on the uranium metal rods, delaying completion by two months. See 
Historique I, n. 25. See also, Historique EL2, 1966, p. 16. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. 
EL2/Zoé/Triton 5/6. (Hereafter referred to as Historique II). See as well Etranges postules 
rongent l’uranium français, paralysant notre 2ème pile atomique. France Dimanche. 7-13 
September 1952; (315): 9; and Kowarski, Lew. La pile de Saclay. Atomes. 1954 May; 13-17.
 28. Kowarski, Lew. Zoé: le départ des piles françaises. Echos du CEA. 1965; (2): 23.
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over 1,000 kilowatts, disaster struck. Increasing reactivity in P2’s core 
generated increasing heat, which in turn required increased circulation of 
the nitrogen coolant. The system could not stand the strain. Vibrations 
in the coolant tubing shook and crimped the tube walls. Radiation from 
the core streamed into the cooling system as compressed gas diffused 
the opposite direction into the core. Only quick opening of a hydraulic 
safety valve prevented the nitrogen from completely fouling the heavy 
water moderator. The cooling system was moderately contaminated with 
radiation and inside the core the fuel elements were damaged. When 
Zoé experienced breakdown, the repairs required days, but with P2, the 
repairs took months, and it was only in January 1954 that it surpassed 1,000 
kilowatts with nitrogen coolant 29.
These were the travails of P2; but the most crucial development in the 
CEA during the years between the completion of Zoé and P2 lay outside 
physical construction. Frédéric Joliot was dismissed from the post of high 
commissioner in April 1950; Administrator General Raoul Dautry died in 
August 1951; at that moment, Félix Gaillard, the state secretary charged 
with atomic affairs, inspired by visions of atomic technologies boosting 
France’s power and prestige, emerged to insist that the CEA steering 
committee design a long-term plan for expansion of CEA mining, research 
and production. An advisory committee proposed several courses of 
action, including mass production of plutonium with graphite-moderated 
piles capable of little else. Such reactors had been built elsewhere, and in 
the face of various arguments, Gaillard was inclined to choose the most 
certain option. All along plutonium production was discussed as a means of 
manufacturing fuel for future secondary reactors, and despite the sole use 
to which plutonium had been put, this did not change after the committee 
named plutonium production the principle goal of the CEA’s first Five-Year 
Plan. The draft of that Plan announced this to the French Parliament. The 
idea that P2 could be expected to fulfil France’s radioisotope needs had 
in fact been circulated since the Joliot days; the Five-Year Plan, calling for 
reactors for plutonium production before research reactors for isotope 
 29. Historique I, n. 25, p. 17. Historique II, n. 27, p. 23. For Zoé see «Rapport d’avarie», September 
29, 1949. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. Archives Zoé, B838.
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irradiations, left P2 as France’s best machine for home-grown radioisotopes 
for the near future 30.
Thus the CEA’s deliveries of isotopes followed P2’s performance. As 
noted, deliveries exclusively from Zoé plateaued in 1951 at 1,431; in 1952 
the total number of deliveries actually dropped to 1,244, as Zoé was under 
reconstruction and P2 was late coming on line. The year 1953 exemplifies 
the deleterious effect that P2’s breakdown had on the production of 
radioisotopes. In a year when deliveries should have jumped due to the 
powerful new reactor, they rose only slightly, to approximately 1,500. The 
CEA was back where it had started, relying on Zoé. Only at the end of the 
year was P2 ready for its first loading tray to be put into service 31. Much 
as they had in 1951, deliveries of radioisotopes again plateaued in 1956 and 
1957, at 3,600 and then 3,740 deliveries. All the while imports crept down 
from a peak of 1,250 in 1953 to approximately 700 in 1957.
P2 was used to do more than just bombard isotopes. Versatility is the 
principle characteristic of any research reactor; in its first five years of 
operation, P2 was used to bombard uranium for the creation of several 
hundred grams of plutonium; it was used to calibrate instruments and 
provide neutrons for experiments, including experiments involving study 
of P2’s own neutron flux; it was used to test materials for reactors to come; 
it was used to study the Wigner effect; and, of course, it was a test bed 
for the compressed CO2 cooling system to be used in the CEA’s future 
industrial-scale reactors. At the beginning of 1954 High Commissioner 
Francis Perrin spelled out P2’s operational priorities: «continuous operations 
for accumulating 250 gm. of Pu»; «regular production of radioisotopes«, 
«detection of leaks in slugs»; «studies in support of G1» 32.
Locally, production of radioisotopes gained priority. Customarily, the 
Section des Radioéléments placed orders: all of the horizontal channels 
 30. As reported in the official documentation in the parliament: «[T]he Saclay pile [Saclay was the 
CEA’s second research facility] will permit more advanced studies (...) and will free France 
for good from its dependence on foreign countries for the production of radio-elements 
indispensable in biology, medical therapy, and even industry». Rapport fait au nom de la 
commission des finances sur le projet de loi de programme (no. 3759) pour la réalisation 
du plan de développement de l’énergie atomique (1952-1957), annexe au procès-verbal de 
la séance du 26 juin 1952. Journal Officiel.
 31. Historique I, n. 25, p. 18.
 32. G1 was the CEA’s first industrial plutonium-production reactor. See below. Historique II, n. 27, 
p. 30.
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on P2’s southern face were reserved for isotope irradiation, and a given 
isotope was to be placed in a specified part of P2’s neutron flux. On Sunday 
nights the Service de la Pile halted P2’s chain reaction; irradiated isotopes 
were unloaded early Monday morning, set on trucks and delivered to the 
Section’s laboratory.
But radioisotopes were not the CEA’s primary concern; plutonium 
was. In one of the CEA histories of P2 («Historique II» here), the number 
of isotopes irradiated in P2 goes unmentioned, while the number of grams 
of plutonium coming from irradiated uranium slugs is recorded (as well as 
the number of grams hoped for but unextracted). Some of these slugs were 
treated in the CEA; others were sent to the British complex at Windscale 
for recovery of the plutonium product. By the end of 1960, P2 had made 
almost 1,500 grams of plutonium (most of it passing through the British as 
opposed to the French processing system), useful indeed for preparations 
to separate and purify plutonium on an industrial scale 33. 
Even the progress of the Section des Radioéléments could be framed 
in terms of plutonium production. Meeting minutes from December 1953 
record a revealing exchange. High Commissioner Francis Perrin: «[T]he 
production of radioisotopes will be greater with two piles [Zoé and P2] 
in operation. There would be reason to reinforce the team handling 
radioisotopes». The reaction of the director of the Department of Chemistry, 
Bertrand Goldschmidt: «M. Goldschmidt believes that the group preparing 
radioisotopes might serve as future plutonium technicians» 34. There are 
at least two possible interpretations of this. No doubt the Section des 
Radioéléments could have used additional personnel, Perrin’s point. At 
the same time, at the end of 1953 Goldschmidt’s division encompassed 
both radioisotope and plutonium production. He might have seen himself 
fulfilling the CEA’s call for plutonium as best he could; or, more cynically, 
he might have thought a reference to plutonium would more likely allow 
him to bring more personnel to the Section des Radioéléments. Either case 
proves the point: at that moment, plutonium had priority in the CEA.
Yet the precedence given to plutonium found in the CEA histories 
should be seen as indicating the versatility of the P2 more than signifying 
 33. Historique I, n. 25, p. 32-33. 
 34. Compte-Rendu de la Réunion des Directeurs Scientifiques et Chefs de Départements, Dec 1, 
1953. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. Boîte F4/20.22 65–40 (HC) Programme des services 
1953-1954. 
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radioisotopes lost to plutonium. As we have seen, radioisotope production 
was planned for and carried out. Of course, underneath the surface of 
this history lies a crucial development. The CEA’s overall focus was on 
plutonium production. Resources went first to the plutonium production 
reactors at Marcoule. No research reactor joined P2 at Saclay until EL3 
came on line in July 1957 (and it was not operated at full power until 
April 1958). Thus, outside of Zoé’s small output and the graphite reactors’ 
production of certain high-energy radioisotopes, P2 was France’s only 
radioisotope-producing reactor. Many individuals and groups in France 
were counting on P2 to boost radioisotope production. P2’s breakdowns 
left them disappointed and reliant on British reactors if they wished to 
advance their techniques. 
5. The production reactors
Zoé, the experimental reactor, brought a new mode of radioisotope 
production and distribution to France; P2, research reactor, was a significant, 
evolutionary improvement. The CEA’s plutonium production reactors, G1, 
G2, and G2’s twin, G3 35 altered the situation yet again. Their contribution 
was neither evolutionary nor revolutionary.
The CEA’s industrial-scale reactors were not as versatile as their 
predecessors. Their designers planned few experimental channels, and 
none in the core’s highest flux; the arrangement of uranium fuel elements 
suited other tasks. Horizontal channels filled with uranium, arranged in a 
lattice and surrounded by graphite, opened for insertion of new slugs and 
disposal of others that were already sufficiently irradiated (G1 had to be 
shut down for removal and loading; G2 and G3, whose channels were open 
at both ends, could be loaded and unloaded while in operation). Unlike Zoé 
and P2, cores could not be reached from channels on all four sides, much 
less from above. G1, and especially G2 and G3, were powerful plutonium 
production reactors, and to a lesser but not negligible extent, electricity-
 35. G1, an air-cooled, natural uranium-fueled, graphite-moderated pilot plant, produced 38 
megawatts of power (and 1.7 megawatts of electricity). G2 and G3, twin compressed gas-
cooled, natural uranium-fueled, graphite-moderated production reactors, produced 200 
megawatts of energy each (and 28 megawatts of electricity each). IAEA Directory of Nuclear 
Reactors. Vols I-IV. Vienna; 1960, 1962, p. 145-149.
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producing machines. The CEA’s directors selected a site for them on the 
Rhone River and found private industrial contractors to build them. G1, G2 
and G3 were the centerpieces of the CEA’s Five-Year Plan, its enablement 
and embodiment.
Perhaps this is why Maurice Pascal, director of industrial production, 
declined Charley Fisher’s request to have isotopes irradiated in the core of 
G1. After all, compared to the nuclear industrial complex at Marcoule, 
Fisher’s Section des Radioéléments was a sideshow. Pascal at first claimed 
that G1’s neutron flux was too weak by a factor of ten to be of any use. 
Fisher made his case: «As concerns the making of carbon-14 and cobalt 
sources, it seems in our common interest to use the tubes intended for 
uranium rods». Fisher knew that G1’s flux was well-suited for making 
radioisotopes, and this was Fisher’s appeal, «our common interest», and 
with the intersession of High Commissioner Francis Perrin, it eventually 
worked. It took more than a year for Fisher to receive permission to use 
four of G1’s channels to make carbon-14 and various isotopes with long 
half-lives, including cobalt-60. Irradiated isotopes could be removed only 
as G1’s normal schedule of shutdowns permitted 36. In the end, G1 added 
little to production, deliveries of radioisotopes in 1956 (approximately 
3,600) increasing by less than two hundred in 1957—and that due mostly 
to the increase in P2’s kilowattage. Nevertheless, the CEA’s graphite 
reactors made the production of several sorts of isotopes and radio-
labelled molecules possible: varieties of carbon-14 and cobalt-60 sources, 
curium-244, iodine-125, iridium-192, plutonium-238 for pacemakers, 
technetium-99 and tritium 37. By the end of the 1950s the French were 
selling certain radio-labelled molecules to American firms 38.
 36. Fabrication de radioéléments artificiels. (Chef du Service des Radioéléments Artificiels [Charley 
Fisher] s/c de M. le Directeur du Département de Chimie au Directeur de la Production 
Industrielle [Maurice Pascal]), February 11, 1955; Chef de Service des Radioéléments au 
Haut-Commissaire, March 26, 1956; Haut-Commissaire au Chef du Service des Radioéléments, 
June 19, 1956. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. HC M6/14-22 (1) 76-879 Dossier Piles de 
M. Yvon; G1, M6/08-60 76-861 (HC).
 37. Mazzucchetti, Denis. De divergences en convergences: les cinquante premières années de 
Marcoule: 1955-2005. CEA; COGEMA: Romain Pages Editions; 2005, p. 89.
 38. Vente de molécules marquées généralités. Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. Boîte F3/19-36 
80-1233 HC Radioéléments.
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6. British reactors
In 1958 the third French research reactor, an enriched uranium pool reactor 
called EL3, reached its design output of 15,000 kilowatts. Radioisotope 
production shot up: 5,997 in 1958, 7,247 in 1959, 9,962 in 1960. The CEA 
no longer had to import radioisotopes to satisfy French demand, and a new 
period of radioisotope production was entered in full.
During the previous period, when the French were dependent on P2, 
they found a site outside of their country for irradiations: the British research 
centre at Harwell. There, a succession of experimental and research reactors 
served up radioisotopes for both the British and the French. In fact, this 
represents but one example of an Anglo-French «spirit of cooperation» 39. 
During the period of this study, the French benefited most. The British 
separated plutonium from uranium slugs irradiated in French reactors; they 
produced radioisotopes which the French either lacked the capacity to make 
or the ability to produce, and sent them to the Section des Radioéléments; 
they made thousands of deliveries to French users; and, as the French 
completed the design of G2 and G3, the British supplied information about 
the Wigner effect.
The British began radioisotope production in 1947, after the construction 
of their first reactor «Gleep» (100 watts in its experimental stage, upgraded 
to 300 watts). Veritable mass production commenced a year later with the 
completion of their second reactor, the graphite-moderated, air-cooled pile 
«Bepo», which achieved 6,500 kilowatts. The output of the latter in particular 
advanced the work of the Section des Radioéléments when P2 could not be 
kept reliably running. The Section had already set the principle in place: 
anticipated separation and preparation techniques could be practiced 
with British radioisotopes before reactors in France could provide proper, 
powerful radiation. Thus, expecting P2 to increase to over 2,000 kilowatts 
by the end of the first trimester of 1953, the Section accepted bricks of 
sulphur bombarded in Bepo to learn certain phosphorous-32 techniques. 
They expected a smooth transition: one hand-written note recorded «P32 (de 
Harwell → P2)». For P2, of course, little went smoothly in 1953. In April the 
CEA was hoping that by the following year «the great majority of artificial 
radioelements used in France should be prepared, distributed and if possible 
 39. Goldschmidt, n. 16.
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produced under our care» 40. But given P2’s uneven performance, nothing 
could be certain, and the CEA radiochemists were perhaps relieved to be 
able to note, «[T]he adopted system of production will be able to count 
continuously on a supplement coming from the Harwell Centre». During the 
first years of importation of radioisotopes from Harwell, personal relations 
were particularly important; Bertrand Goldschmidt and the director of the 
radioisotope division at Harwell, Henry Seligman, had worked together in 
Canada during the war. By the end of 1953, the French had negotiated an 
official agreement with Harwell 41. 
7. Conclusion: radioisotopes, research reactors, and system orientation
All devices for irradiating French isotopes —the cyclotron, experimental, 
research and production reactors, and the British reactors— shared one 
thing in common. All sent their irradiation products to the Section des 
Radioéléments of the CEA (the unit was raised in the hierarchy from 
Section to Service in 1954, notably after P2, nursed through its worst 
troubles, was in steady operation). All radioisotopes had to pass through 
it. Then again, the Section des Radioéléments had to rely on all groups 
irradiating isotopes.
The tenor of these relationships differed, as we have seen. Charlie 
Fisher had to negotiate with Maurice Pascal and rely on the authority of 
the high commissioner before gaining spaces in the core of the plutonium-
production reactors. By comparison, access to free channels in P2 was not 
just easy, but assumed. The Section des Radioéléments was a privileged user, 
or, to quote P2 engineer Jacques Bernot, a «privileged client» 42, —a client 
considered significant, as the start-up and shutdown schedule of P2 shows. 
The Section des Radioéléments might also have thought of themselves as a 
client of the British at Harwell. While work with P2 hinged on expectations 
 40. Programmes et services scientifiques et techniques au cours du premier semestre 1953. 
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. Programmes Généralités (1953) F4/20.22 65–40 (HC) 
Programme des services 1953-1954.
 41. Directeur chargé du Département de Chimie au Monsieur le Haut-Commissiare, April 20, 1953. 
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique. F4/20 22 65-40 (H-C) Progammes de Services 1953-
1954.
 42. Bernot, Jacques. Interview, 31 October 2005.
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of radioisotope production within a single technological system, work with 
the British depended on personal relations. 
On the whole, the Section/Service des Radioéléments was a stable entity 
throughout our period: steady growth; a trouble-free, welcomed move from 
Châtillon to Saclay; a smooth transition from laboratory to pilot-plant scale 
operation for mass preparations; the same man in charge throughout. A fire 
in the administrative office in 1957 may have been the greatest disruption 
the Service experienced 43. When it lacked powerful enough radioisotopes to 
prepare new handling techniques, the British reactors filled the gap. In the 
re-organization of the CEA in October 1959, the Department of Chemistry, 
in which the Service des Radioéléments had been located, was eliminated, 
and the Service was placed (along with most of Chemistry’s units) in the 
Direction des Matériaux et des Combustibles Nucléaires. The greatly increased 
numbers of radioisotopes made possible by new machines like EL3 and 
the Service des Radioéléments’ own multiple-building preparation facility 
equipped with remote-control laboratories, and the resulting expansion 
of production of radioisotopes, gave this organizational change —a sign of 
mass production— a powerful logic 44.
Compared to the growth of the Section/Service des Radioéléments, 
there was less continuity to reactor development. To recapitulate: Zoé, 
first reactor, from zero power to upgraded low power (the CEA’s romantic 
phase: at Zoé’s inauguration one engineer cooed «very gentle, very calm, 
this nice Zoé» 45); P2, troubled from the start, a platform for experiments, 
instrument calibrations, irradiations and systems trials; G1, the first in a 
line of graphite-moderated reactors, a pilot plant for plutonium production 
and a site for establishing a new working relationship between the CEA 
and industries; G2 and G3, the most massive CEA reactors of our period, 
combining the graphite and core arrangement of G1 with the cooling system 
 43. The fire was a bane to the historian as well, as many of the Service’s records were 
destroyed.
 44. The reorganization of the Department of Chemistry in 1953 had already revealed the lines 
of the CEA system of production. According to the 1953 Annual Report, its two «essential» 
tasks were the «classic process of the uranium cycle», the preparation of uranium metal 
for reactors, and the «radioactive process of the uranium cycle after irradiation in the pile 
(extraction of plutonium and decontaminated uranium, and separation of fission products), 
as well as that necessary for the preparation of artificial radioelements».
 45. «‘Zoé’ se cache derrière cette lourde porte de plomb» a dit Joliot-Curie aux journalistes. Ce 
Soir. 21 Dec 1948: 1.
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pioneered by P2, able to produce dozens of kilograms of plutonium as 
well as thirty megawatts of electricity each; EL3, P2’s successor, possessing 
three times its predecessor’s power, for years one of the foci of the Saclay 
complex; and the British reactors: Gleep, the first reactor, equivalent to the 
upgraded Zoé in power; Bepo, as powerful as P2 but more reliable; and 
the Windscale piles, Britain’s plutonium-production reactors, capable of 
making sources like cobalt-60.
That products from all of these different machines were sent to the 
Service des Radioéléments indicates three things. First, as noted, for whatever 
differences they presented from the outside, their innermost process was 
the same, the neutron-initiated fission chain reaction. If an isotope could 
open its eyes and «see» what was happening inside any of these reactors, 
the view would be much the same: a world of energetic neutrons, fissioning 
uranium atoms and slowly accumulating fission products. Only the moderator 
might differ.
Second, even if radioisotopes were not at the centre of the French atomic 
project, they were not an unanticipated, unforeseen bonus. From 1947 at 
the latest, the CEA Scientific Committee had every intention of producing 
radioisotopes, and the CEA’s first high commissioner, Frédéric Joliot, had 
dreamed of making radioisotopes for years; radioisotope production was 
given significant priority at Zoé and especially P2; arrangements were made 
with the British to manufacture radioisotopes «hot» enough to allow the 
Section des Radioéléments to advance its techniques. When the Section 
received its first shipment of radioisotopes, it was not only welcomed; it 
was expected.
Third, at their most basic, with very few exotic exceptions, all reactors 
are versatile slow-neutron fission machines, and virtually all of them can 
be used to irradiate isotopes. Experimental and research reactors are 
especially adaptable. Even before her upgrade, Zoé went from being a 
proof-of-principle experimental machine to an instrument and tool: a 
research reactor for physicists and chemists, a production reactor for the 
chemists and engineers of the Section des Radioéléments, a calibrator for 
the Service des Constructions Electriques, a material-testing machine for the 
team preparing to build P2, and eventually a training reactor. 
In 1955, at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy, Lew Kowarski gave his definition for «research reactor» Struggling 
to find a way to distinguish peaceful apparatus from others, he hints at the 
primacy of context:
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«A research reactor may be defined as one which has been built for the 
purpose of gaining information, rather than for producing useful energy or 
transmuted substances. The information sought may be totally extraneous 
to the reactor itself, or reactor technology; the reactor then serves as a 
tool and a source of radiations (chiefly neutrons). Or it may be used as an 
object of research; a line is to be drawn here between research and advanced 
development in the pre-production stage; some pilot versions of industrial 
reactors, although —strictly speaking— of mainly informative interest, are 
too closely connected with production programmes to be considered research 
reactors [his emphasis]» 46.
«Some pilot versions of industrial reactors (...) of mainly informative 
interest»: an illustration of what Kowarski meant is found in the American 
wartime reactor, X-10, a pilot-plant reactor built at the Clinton laboratories 
of Oak Ridge. The Smyth Report described X-10 as a «small-scale semi-
works» 47. The X-10 pilot reactor and a pilot separation facility paved 
the way for mass production of enough plutonium to manufacture two 
plutonium-fuelled atomic bombs per month. This scale of production 
commenced when the three full-scale reactors and two full-scale plutonium 
separation plants in Hanford came on line at the end of 1944. Up to then, if 
we follow Kowarski’s logic, X-10 was «too closely connected with productions 
programmes» to be a research reactor.
This changed, although X-10’s configuration remained the same. X-10 
allowed for more than convenient extraction of irradiated uranium slugs. 
It could be used for research, one reason the University of Chicago, and 
 46. Kowarski, Lew. Report on Research Reactors. For the International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy. July 12, 1955. Niels Bohr Library, American Institute of Physics. 
Additions Series II, Box 10, Folder 12.
  More definitions, this time from John F. Hogerton’s The Atomic Textbook (1963). Four reactor 
types are defined: (1) Power reactors: reactors used as energy sources for electric power 
generation or propulsion; (2) Production reactor: reactors used to produce fissionable 
materials for defense stockpiles; (3) Test reactors: reactors used to conduct tests in support 
of reactor development, irradiations and heat tests; (4) Research reactors: reactors used for 
nuclear physics (cross sections, etc.), solid state physics (neutron diffraction of crystalline 
structures), radiation chemistry, analytical chemistry, biology, medicine, reactor development, 
production of radioisotopes, student training. P2 broke down these definitions, fitting (3) 
test reactor, and (4) research reactor, perfectly well, and serving as a (2) production reactor 
of sorts until 1956, when G1 came on line. Hogerton, John F. The atomic energy textbook. 
New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation; 1963, p. 473.
 47. Smyth, Henry D. Atomic energy for military purposes. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
1948, p. 111.
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not Du Pont, was asked to operate it 48. At the end of 1944 the Clinton 
laboratory’s scientists began to take advantage of these latter capabilities, 
namely
«slots for indium foils to measure neutron intensity, test holes for irradiation 
of sample materials, two tunnels for exposing small animals to radiation 
[sic], a pneumatic system for very brief irradiations of small samples, three 
aluminium tubes for experiments with water cooling, two holes for neutron 
spectrometers, and two columns of graphite blocks for exposing samples to 
slow neutrons» 49.
Immediately the reactor began irradiating isotopes. X-10, pilot-plant 
reactor, without alteration of its design, became a research reactor 50.
Due to such versatility, this ability to be wheeled around and driven 
in another direction, research reactors can reveal the orientation of an 
atomic programme. They do this just as effectively as specialized industrial 
machines built to mass produce plutonium: an inventory of whatever passes 
through their cores reveals what an atomic programme is about (and can 
do so before the industrial-scale reactors are up and running). At the same 
time, despite the unique nature of the materials they use, the specialists 
they require, and the large complex machines that compose them, atomic 
programmes are not monoliths. This perhaps goes without saying: not only 
do they encompass sites —mines, reactors, laboratories— that differ greatly 
from one to the next. Even to visit only the reactors of a large programme 
like the CEA in the 1950s meant encountering many very different machines 
and facilities. The various sub-systems of production in atomic programmes, 
making, for example, enriched uranium, plutonium, electricity, radiation 
counters 51 —or radioisotopes— are linked by material and institution but 
are different nevertheless. As noted, assembling a system of radioisotope 
 48. Smyth, n. 47, p. 111.
 49. Hewlett, Richard G.; Anderson, Oscar E. A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: 
The new world, 1939-1946. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press; 
1962, p. 196-197.
 50. X-10 went critical in November 1943; by the end of 1944 it was used for radioisotope production. 
See Swords to Plowshares: A Short History of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. U.S. 
Department of Energy; 1993. [accessed 5 Nov 2005]. Available at www.ornl.gov/info/swords/
swords.html..
 51. The CEA’s most conspicuous physical output before Zoé.
Matthew Adamson
Dynamis 20 09; 29: 261-28 4
284
production is relatively cheap 52; in France, like the US and Britain, the 
rising tide of resources accompanying atomic industrialization lifted all 
ships, including such production. On the one hand, the CEA did not finish 
its second high-power research reactor, EL3, until 1958, a good twelve 
years after its foundation, while at the same time finishing pilot-plant and 
full-scale plutonium-production reactors. The priority given to plutonium 
production is clear; it is all the more so when we take into account the 1,500 
grams of plutonium created inside P2. But on the other hand, the French 
did nurture a radioisotope production system all along, securing a supply 
of radioisotopes for the Section des Radioéléments to perfect techniques 
when French production was not enough. 
As Gabrielle Hecht describes, the constraints imposed by the design of 
production reactors can reveal the orientation of an atomic programme. G1, 
G2 and G3 could all produce plutonium and electricity, but they could only 
make one efficiently, and this turned out, not by accident, to be the former. 
The versatility of research reactors points all the same to the orientation of an 
atomic programme. P2 could irradiate anything with equal effectiveness; its 
users only contraints were found in limited neutron flux, unavailable channels 
and limited reactor time. An inventory of what went into those channels 
—radioisotopes included— and the lack of a younger, more powerful sister 
research reactor until 1958, reveals the CEA’s orientation: its commitment 
to bomb-grade plutonium, and its commitment to radioisotopes, pursued 
with less urgency, but committed to nevertheless. ❚
 52. Angela Creager notes the words of a 1947 American Atomic Energy Commission report: «The 
cost of producing these radioactive and non-radioactive isotopes is a very small fraction 
of the cost of the atomic energy programme as a whole, but the value of the benefits is 
incalculable». Creager, n. 2, p. 149.
